Abstract-In this paper, we present a new method to build public-key Cryptosystem. The method is based on the state explosion problem occurred in the computing of average number of tokens in the places of Stochastic Petri Net (SPN). The reachable markings in the coverability tree of SPN are used as the encryption keys. Accordingly, multiple encryption keys can be generated, thus we can perform multiple encryption to get as strong security as we expect. The decryption is realized through solving a group of ordinary differential equations from Continuous Petri Net (CPN), which has the same underlying Petri net as that of SPN. The decipherment difficulty for attackers is in exponential order. The contribution of this paper is that we can use continuous mathematics to design cryptosystems besides discrete mathematics.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet has become so widespread that any one can obtain and provide information easily through the public network. To guarantee the safe communications, the utilization of cryptography becomes very important in order to avoid the leak of secret information or dishonest alternation of the information.
There are two types of cryptography: private-key and public-key cryptosystems. Private-key cryptosystem uses a common private key to encrypt and decrypt messages, and can process encryption and decryption very fast, but it faces a problem to distribute the private key through the public network without leaking of the secrecy [22] [23] . Public-key cryptosystem successfully solves this problem by preparing a pair of keys (public and private keys) in the way that it opens the public key to the public and keeps the private key in secret [19] .
Currently, there are a few public-key cryptosystems, such as RSA [21] , ElGamal [4] , and the elliptic curve cryptography [18] . Since the security(encryption or decryption) of RSA is O(exp(c(logn)(loglogn)) 1/2 ) (c is a constant, and n is a large factoring number), which is subexponential order rather than an exponential order, we may classify these crytosystems as subexponential cryptosystems. Recently, Ge and Okamoto [7] proposed a new publickey cryptography, namely PNPKC, and Ge et al. [8] proposed a Multiple-Encryption Public-Key Cryptography, namely MEPKC. Both Cryptography use elementary Tinvariants of Petri nets as the public keys. The security is e m , where m is the number of transitions of the Petri net. If the encryption is performed in k stages, then the security will be (e m ) k . Such kind of crytosystems can be called exponential cryptosystems.
So far, the public-key cryptosystems are designed with discrete mathematics. In this paper we propose a new public-key cryptography by using continuous mathematics. The encryption part is based on the well known state explosion problem of stochastic Petri nets(SPN), i.e. the state space will increase exponentially as the number of places or the number of initial marking values increases, even through many reduction skills have been proposed to combat this problem such as [13] [26] . The decryption part is based on a group of ordinary differential equations, which can be easily solved by using RungeKutta algorithm [9] .
The encryption key is composed of a reachable marking in the coverability tree of SPN and the average number of tokens in the places of SPN. A brief description is in the following: The sender randomly select a group of initial markings from a well designed range to generate the coverability tree of a SPN, and compute the average number of tokens of SPN by some software such as SPNP and GreatSPN. By combing this reachable marking and the average number of tokens together in some way, we will get the encryption key. This key is a number that has integral part and decimal fraction part.
The uniqueness of reachable markings guarantee that the encryption key is unique. The key is hidden in a knapsack problem, which is NP-complete. Multiple encryption keys can be generated, thus we can perform multiple encryption to get as strong security as we expect.
Hence, we open a key generator to the public.
For the attacker to decrypt, he/she has three difficulties: 1) To compute all the average numbers of tokens of the Petri nets that have initial marking from the given range. If we carefully design the maximum value of the range, then it is hard for attackers to solve all the average number of tokens even using some software. 2) From these average numbers of tokens, the attacker needs to determine which one matches the decimal fraction, and thus to determine the initial marking value selected by the sender.
3) The attacker needs to generate the coverability tree based on this initial marking value, and to determine which reachable marking in the tree has been selected by the sender, in other words, to determine the integral part of of the key.
For the receiver to decrypt the ciphertext, he/she also needs to solve all the average number of tokens of the Petri nets that have initial marking values in the given range. However, the receiver can get these average numbers of tokens by solving a set of ordinary differential equations, which is simple. In the equations, the initial values correspond to the initial markings. The set of equations comes from Continuous Petri Net (CPN), of which the underlying Petri net is the same as that of SPN. CPN is defined recently by David and Alla [2] [3] attempting to deal with the state explosion problem of discrete Petri net by removing the integrality constraints. The solutions of the equations are called state measures in the places. In this paper, we have proved that the state measures in the places equal the average numbers of tokens in the places.
Analysis shows that the security for our method is
where v is the length of the range of initial marking values, I is the number of places that can be set the initial markings from the range, n is the number of places of the Petri net, k is the maximum number of tokens in the initial markings, and P (k, n), Q(k, n) are two polynomials of k, and n. If applying r-stage encryption, the security can
. We are not claiming that our public-key encryptosystem is superior to the existing encryptosystems. It is our attempt to design the public-key encryptosystem from a different angle, and give some suggestions in this field.
The rest of the paper is organized as the following: Section 2 briefly introduces the method to compute the average number of tokens of SPN and gives the computational complexity. Section 3 presents a method to compute the state measures of CPN and analyzes the computational complexity. Section 4 proves that the average numbers of tokens of SPN equal the state measures of CPN. Section 5 discusses the security of our SPN based public-key cryptograph. In Section 6, we use a concrete example to illustrate how to use our method to design a public-key cryptograph. Section 7 discusses a related work. The last section, section 8 concludes the paper by simply describing how to combine our system with other encryption system for digital signature, and indicating our future work.
II. THE METHOD TO COMPUTE THE AVERAGE NUMBER OF TOKENS OF SPN AND ITS COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY

A. Stochastic Petri Nets(SPN)
The following definition comes from [14] . 
where x represents time, X t is a continuous random variable representing the time delay for transition t, λ t is the average firing rate associated with transition t.
A Markov process is a stochastic process that satisfies the Markovian property
Markov processes with a discrete state space are called Markov chains. If the parameter t is continuous, the process is a continuous-time Markov chain (CTMC). The time spent in states of a CTMC is a random variable with nonnegative exponential probability density function(pdf).
In practice, a CTMC is described through either a state transition rate diagram or a transition rate matrix, denoted by Q. The state transition rate diagram is a labelled directed graph whose vertices are labelled with the CTMC states, and whose arcs are labelled with the rate of the exponential distribution associated with the transition from a state to another.
If we have the reachable graph (or coverability tree) of SPN, then replacing the firing transition t associated with the arc by average firing rate λ t (or marking related λ t ), we will get the CTMC that is isomorphic to SPN. Actually we have the following result [15] . Theorem 2.2: Any SPN with finite places and finite transitions is isomorphic to a Continuous Time Markov Chain.
This result enables us to compute average number of tokens in places of SPN.
B. Method To Compute The Average Number of Tokens In Places of SPN
Average number of tokens in places is an important parameter in system performance analysis. It can be solved through the following steps [15] .
(1) Constructing transition rate matrix Q = [q ij ] The transition rate matrix can be constructed from the coverability tree of SPN. For the elements a ij outside the main diagonal: if there is an arc from state M i to state M j , then the value is the rate of the exponential distribution associated with the transition from M i to M j ; if there is no arc connected, then this element is 0. For the element a ii on the main diagonal, its value is the opposite of the sum of firing rates outputted from state M i .
(2) Finding the steady state probability X = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x l ), where l is the number of all reachable markings in the coverability tree of SPN. 
where Q is a l dimension square matrix. (3) Constructing place state table Based on the coverability tree of SPN, we list all the reachable markings. Every reachable marking is a ndimension vector, which is a row in the table. Thus the table has l rows and n columns.
(4) Obtaining the token probability density function (pdf)
That is to find in the steady state the probability of the number of tokens contained in a place. For a p ∈ P , letting P [M (p) = i] denote the probability of i tokens contained in place p, then the token pdf can be obtained as
where
Finding the average number of tokens in places For any p ∈ P , in the steady state,
is the average number of tokens in place p for any reachable marking.
C. The complexity of finding the average number of tokens in the places
Currently, the best algorithm to solve the equation group
is from Harrow et al. [10] and the complexity is O(l). l depends on n, k and can be estimated as the following. Let k be the maximum number of tokens in the initial markings. Since the size of the reachability graph increases exponentially with both the number of places and the number of tokens in the initial marking, we may assume
is a polynomial of k and n. Thus, the complexity to solve this equation group is O(a p(k,n) ). From step (3) of Section 2.2, the complexity to find the average number of tokens in a single place is
Hence to find average number of tokens in n places, the complexity is
III. THE METHOD TO COMPUTE THE STATE MEASURES OF CPN AND ITS COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY
Since the size of reachable markings in the coverability tree increases exponentially with both the number of places and the number of tokens in the initial marking. As a result, we will not be able to compute the steady state probability for very large models. We will use some relaxation technique to overcome this difficulty. This relaxation leads to a continuous-time formalism: Continuous Petri Net (CPN).
A. Continuous Petri Net Definition 3.1: A Continuous Petri Net is a tuple
is the set of arcs, and M 0 is the initial marking. λ = {λ 1 , λ 2 , . . . , λ m } is a set of average firing rates of transitions.
In the definition, the average firing rate λ t is actually the reciprocal of firing delay of transition t. In a CPN, the marking of a place is no longer an integer but a nonnegative real number. A transition is enabled if all the input places have nonzero markings. Only enabled transitions can be fired. So, if some marking is moved into a place, we say that the state measure in this place is increasing; if some marking is moved out from a place, we say that the state measure in this place is decreasing. The change rate of state measure can be calculated as the following.
Let p 1 and p 2 be the input places of a transition t and their markings are m 1 (τ ) and m 2 (τ ), respectively. Let λ t be the firing rate associated with t, then following the definition of Continuous Petri net defined by David and Alla [2] [3], the marking moving out from p 1 and p 2 is defined by λ t × min{m 1 (τ ), m 2 (τ )}. If t has only one input p 1 , then marking λ t × m 1 (τ ) will be moved out from p 1 .
We consider the following type of Petri net as the underlying Petri net of SPN and CPN. It is a subclass of normal Petri net net, namely Message Passing Petri net, or MP for short. Definition 3.4: A Petri net P is MP if -P has finitely many places; -the places of P are partitioned into two disjoint partitions C and B; -each place from C has one or two input transitions and one or two output transitions, but can not have two input transitions and two output transitions at the same time; -each place from B has one input transition and one output transition; -each transition has one input place from C and one output place from C; and -each transition has either 1) no input places from B and no output places from B; 2) no input places from B and one output place from B;
3) one input place from B and no output places from B; or 4) one input place from B and one output place from B. Here C stands for "Internal States", while B stands for "Buffer". In a MP, the Internal States and the directly connected transitions form one or several place/transition cycles, namely process net. Hence a MP can also be described as process nets that interact to each other through Buffer B.
With such kind of Petri net structure, the state space still increases exponentially as the number of tokens in the Internal States or Buffer increases.
B. Solving State Measures From Ordinary Differential Equation Model
Based on the semantics defined above, the state measure at each place can be calculated from a differential equation. We have the following cases.
1) One place to one place. As Fig.1 shows, place p will get marking from place p 1 . Let the marking at place p and p 1 be m and m 1 , respectively. Assume that the firing rates at transition t 1 and t are d 1 and d, respectively. Then the state measure m can be represented as
If at least one of t 1 and t is not enabled, then m 1 (τ ) = 0 or/and m(t) = 0. Hence the above equation is still true in these situations. 2) Two place to one place. As Fig. 2 shows, place p will get marking from place p 1 and p 2 . Let the markings at place p 1 , p 2 and p be m 1 , m 2 and m, respectively. Assume that the firing rates at transition t 1 and t are d 1 and d, respectively. Then the state measure m can be represented as
If t 1 is not enabled, then m 1 (τ ) = 0 or/and m 2 (τ ) = 0. If t is not enabled, then m(τ ) = 0. Hence the above equation also covers these situations.
3) One place to two places. As Fig. 3 shows, place p will get marking from place p 1 , but will send some marking out together with place p 2 . Let the markings at place p 1 , p 2 and p be m 1 , m 2 and m, respectively. Assume that the firing rates at transition t 1 and t are d 1 From the differential equation model, we see that state measures are uniquely determined by the system structure and the firing rates.
C. The Computational Complexity
To get the state measures of all the places, we need to solve the initial value problem of ordinary differential equations.
Generally speaking, it is hard to find explicit analytic solutions for nonlinear ordinary differential equations, thus most of the time, we turn to find numerical solutions instead. We may use function ode45 in Matlab to solve our equations. Function ode45 is the implementation of combined fourth and fifth-order Runge-Kutta method. ode45 is designed to handle the following general problem
where t is the independent variable and x is a vector of dependent variables to be found. Numerical solutions may give us computational errors due to the algorithm and the machine. In our situation, the computation error can come from two sources: truncation error (because a truncated Taylor Series is used in the computation), and rounding error (because a finite number of binary digits is used inside the machine).
For the truncation error, since the fourth-order RungeKutta method has local truncation error O(h 5 ) and the fifth-order Runge-Kutta method has local truncation error O(h 6 ), where h is the step size, thus the global truncation error of ode45 is O(h 5 ) [9] . Noticing that the fifth-order Runge-Kutta method can automatically adjust the step size, thus ode45 can approximate to the given accuracy by setting opts with command odeset. For the rounding error, since implicit Runge-Kutta method has stable area [9] , and the algorithm is guaranteed to converge in the stable area. Thus the rounding error of the perturbation can not increase and will decrease to 0 in the iteration process [1] .
For the complexity of Runge-Kutta method, if the accuracy is lower than 0.00001, then Runge-Kutta method is more efficient than Newton method. We know that the complexity for Newton method in general is O(mn 3 ), where n is the number of variables and m is the iteration, which is usually O(n) and never exceeds O(n 2 ) [25] . Hence, the complexity for Runge-Kutta method in general is O(n 4 ) and never exceeds O(n 5 ). Thus solving the state measure needs time O(n 5 ), where n is the number of places.
IV. AVERAGE NUMBERS OF TOKENS OF SPN = STATE MEASURES OF CPN
SPN and CPN describe the events of the system, execution time of events, and the relations between events. In both models, the average execution time of events represent the firing rates of the corresponding transitions. The difference is located in: 1) In SPN, the average number of tokens are obtained by computing Markov chain, while in CPN, the state measures are obtained by solving ordinary differential equations; 2) The computational complexity for SPN is exponential while the computational complexity for CPN is polynomial.
The following result gives us the relation of SPN and CPN.
Theorem 4.1: If SPN and CPN are modeling the same system, then the average number of tokens in places of SPN equal the state measures in places of CPN.
Proof 4.2:
Our proof is on the basis of [12] . We consider three situations.
(1) Net with single input Fig . 5 shows a transition with a single input. In the figure, p is the input place of transition tt, m(t) represents the state measure of p at time t, d is the average firing rate of tt, W is the time delay of tt. Assume that p has initial value k 1 at time t 0 . In SPN, a transition needs time from enabled to firing, and this time is represented by a random variable W , which is subjected to an exponential distribution function:
Assume that after ∆t time, the average number of tokens of p is k
In CPN, for this net, we have equation
Thus in this case, our result is correct. 
In CPN, for this net, we have equations:
with the initial values:
Since min{x 1 , x 2 } is nondeterministic at every time t, it is hard to give analytic solution. With numerical solution, we may partition ∆t into several small intervals ∆t i , such that on each such interval, min{x 1 , x 2 } will take a fixed value. Now we solve the equations on interval ∆t 1 as the follows.
. Since in the steady state, the output markings from p 1 and p 2 are equal, and the output marking from p 2 is k 2 −k 2 e −d∆t1 = k 2 (1 − e −d∆t1 ), so the output marking from p 1 should be
). Combining i) and ii), we get k
, which is the same as the average marking of SPN. We will get similar results on other intervals. Hence in this case, our result is also correct.
(3) Now consider the general cases for Fig. 1, Fig.2 , Fig.3 , and Fig.4 . In SPN, for ∀t ∈ T , its marking flow rate, i.e. average marking moving to the output place in unit time, is R(t, s) = W (t, s)× ∑ M ∈E P (M )×λ, where E is the set of all reachable markings that make t enable, λ is the average firing rate of t, W (t, s) is the weight attached to the arc from transition t to place s. From the proof of (1) and (2), we know that Hence for the place m in Fig. 1, Fig.2, Fig.3 , and Fig.4 , at time t, the average number of markings of a place = average number of markings to this place -average number of markings out this place, i.e., Fig. 1 ; Fig.2 ; Fig.3 ; Fig.4 . These expressions are actually the solutions of Equation (1), Equation (2), Equation (3), and Equation (4) Hence, we complete the proof.
V. PUBLIC-KEY CRYPTOSYSTEM
A. Public Key and Private Key 1) Public Key:
Let ⟨ ∑ , H⟩ be a public key, where ∑ = (P, T, A, M 0 , λ) is a bounded Stochastic Petri Net that has an MP as the underlying Petri net. H is a Hash fucntion which will be defined in the following.
For any p i ∈ P , let M 0 (p i ) represent the initial marking value for place p i with the range
Assume that the sender randomly selects the initial markings M + 0 (p i ) from these range. Define
Here H 1 is usually a linear function depending on the size of SPN, the maximum number of tokens in the initial markings, and the memory size. Let CT ( ∑ (M ′ 0 )) be the coverability tree of the net. Define V by V =
H(M
i is the transpose of J i ; R 1 is a n dimension vector with positive integers;
, where H 2 is 1-1 mapping; R 2 is a randomly selected n dimension vector with positive integers. , u 2 , . . . , u n ) , u i is the average number of tokens in place p i of SPN, that can be solved by the sender. p(∈ N ) is an integer depending on the selection of R 2 and M 0 (p i ), n 1 ≤ M 0 (p i ) ≤ n 2 , which can determine as the following. The receiver calculates the maximum value of all R 2 U T by solving the equation groups as discussed in Section 3.3. Let M be the maximum. Then take p = min{q ∈ N |10 q ≥ M }. This p can guarantee that the number 10 −p max{R 2 U T } is a decimal fraction, thus the number V 3 = H 3 (U ) = 10 −p R 2 U T = g from the sender is also a decimal fraction. The receiver then computes all the V 3 , and finds which V 3 is the most closest one to this g. The initial markings for this closest V 3 are exactly the initial markings selected by the sender. However, the attacker does not know how to generate p. In order to get p, the attacker has to has to try every possible initial marking, and calculate all possible
The complexity for the attacker will be in multiple exponential.
2) Private Key:
The private key is designed as < E, H 2 >, where E is a set of equations consisting of the following six types of ordinary differential equations generated from Petri net MP: 
Here m i and m i−1 are the states of the same process net. m k and m l are the inputs to this process net from buffer.
Here m i and m i ′ are the states of two different service nets respectively. m k is the message between these two service nets.
Here m i and m i ′ are the states of two different service nets respectively. m k and m l are the messages between these two service nets, where m l is usually indicates the request that can be calculated by Type 5 and m k is the reply.
is a mapping which can be determined based on the reachable marking set of coverability tree through the formula
We claim that it is almost impossible to derive private key from public key. The reason is as the following. If we design the k( the maximum number of tokens in the initial markings) and the range of H 1 big enough, the attacker needs to try all possible initial markings to determine M + 0 (p i ), and then further to determine CT (
) and all the J i , and finally to determine the J i in the private key. The whole process is multiple exponentially hard.
B. Encryption and Decryption
1) Steps of Encryption:
There are five steps in the encryption.
(1) For a plaintext P , the sender generates cipertext C ′ 1
using symmetric cryptosystems such as AES and 3DES.
(2) Randomly select the initial value
Following the method to calculate the average number of tokens of SPN in the steady state and using some software such as SPNP or GreatSPN, we can compute
, and then get the coverability tree CT (
in the public key, we compute V 2 and thus obtain the value of V = V 2 +V 3 , which is a number with integral part and decimal part. 
in the public key, we can determine the coverability tree I possibilities to select trees. Hence, for one time decryption, the complexity is (n 2 − n 1 + 1)
However, the receiver only needs to solve a group of ordinary differential equation group and the complexity is O(n 5 ). When the initial markings are changed, the initial values to the ordinary differential equation group will be changed, but the complexity to solve the equation group still stays the same. Thus to determine the initial marking of places selected by sender, the receiver at most needs to solve the equation group (n 2 − n 1 + 1) I times, so the complexity for the decryption is (n 2 − n 1 + 1)
I O(n 5 ).
2) The Complexity for Multiple Encryption:
In order to increase the decryption difficulty, we may adopt multistage encryption. The corresponding complexity is as the following.
(1) Since in every stage the selected row vectors J i are different, then the complexity to decipher r-stage encryption plain text is (n 2 − n 1 + 1)
We may increase the process nets in the Petri net, i.e. to increase the index I in the expression (n 2 − n 1 + 1) n) ), then as the number of process nets increase, the complexity will increase exponentially.
(3) We may increase the the maximum number k of tokens in the initial marking, accordingly, the state space will expand quickly and attackers can not compress this expanding state space caused by the increasing number of tokens.
In summary, the computing time for an attacker to compute the average number of tokens is exponential, thus it is hard to get the coverability tree selected by sender. On the other hand, in our public key, based on the knapsack problem (NP-complete problem [6] ), we have designed a Hash function V 2 = H 2 (J i ) = R 1 J T i . Thus the attacking to our encryption is also a NP-complete problem.
VI. AN EXAMPLE TO DESIGN A PUBLIC-KEY CRYPTOSYSTEM
A. Preparing Public Key and Private Key
(1) Choose a bounded Petri net as shown in Fig. 7 . Fig. 8(a)(b) can be used for multiple encryption, where (a) is to increase the number of process nets and (b) is to increase the Internal States in the process net. In Fig. 7 
, and the firing rates for the transitions t 1 , t 2 , t 3 and t 4 are 1. M 0 (p 1 ) and M 0 (p 3 ) are in the range: 
Note that here we design
only for the convenience, and H 1 in the real time is designed based on the ability to decipher the text, memory and the calculation speed.
ii) Randomly select R 1 = (1, 5, 13, 17, 7, 23) for
iii) Randomly select R 2 = (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 ). Based on the formula V 3 = H 3 (U ) = 10 −p R 2 U T , we determine p by calculating the maximum value of 
(3) Private key. First to determine E, which is a set of ordinary differential equations as the following: we determine the coverability tree in the situation M 0 (s 1 ) = M 0 (s 3 ) = 2, which is shown in Fig. 9 .
Since there are 18 reachable markings in the tree, we will have 18 row vectors. Based on the formula V 2 =
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have developed a new public-key cryptosystm based on the difficulty to solve average number of tokens in places of SPN for a given range of initial marking values, and used CPN to perform the decryption. The reachable markings in coverability tree of SPN are used as the encryption key, and the plaintext can be encrypted in multiple stages. Comparing with the traditional public-key cryptosystms such as RSA, PGP, our technique has higher security. Moreover, the encryption and the decryption are easier.
Usually both the public key and the private key in the public-key cryptosystem can be used to encrypt plaintext, such as RSA, ECC, etc. However, in our technique, only public key can be used for the encryption, so our technique can not be used for digital signature. To overcome this shortcoming, we may combine our system with those public-key cryptosystems that are qualified for digital signature. Now we use DSA as the example to illustrate the encryption and decryption process. Assume that the sender A(with DSA) sends the plaintext P to the receiver B(with our technique). The public key and private key of A are K eA and K dA , and public key and private key of B are K eB and K dB , respectively. A first uses its own private key K dA to encrypt the plaintext P , and the result is S = E(P, K dA ); then A uses the public key K eB of B to encrypt S, and the result is C = E(S, K eB ); finally A sends C to B. After B receives C, B uses its own private key K dB to decrypt C, and obtain S = D(C, K dB ); then uses the public key K eA of A to decrypt S, and obtain P = D(S, K eA ). Thus the secret and the reality are promised. In this way, our technique can also be used for digital signature.
In order to increase the attack difficulty, we may design more complicated hash function H in the public key. We may also combine our cryptosystem with other cryptosystems to increase the security. One may notice that while our technique increase the decryption difficulty for attackers, it also increase the computing work for the receivers. Two issues will be solved in the future: 1) How to store all reachable markings in the coverability tree of SPN; 2) How to estimate security if the key itself gets brute force attack.
